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The present article seeks to explore how asylum law is formed, transformed and reformed in 
Europe, what its effects are on state practice and refugee protection in the Baltic and Central 
European candidate countries, and what this process reveals about the framework used by 
scholars to understand the dynamics of international refugee law. Arguably, an exclusive 
focus on EU institutions and their dissemination of regional and international norms among 
candidate countries through the acquis communitaire is misleading. Looking at the sub-
regional interplay between Vienna and Budapest, Berlin and Warsaw, Copenhagen and 
Vilnius provides a richer understanding of the emergence of norms than the standard 
narrative of a Brussels dictate. Hence, to capture these dynamics, we will attempt to expand 
the framework of analysis by incorporating sub-regional settings, cutting across the divide 
between old and new Members, and by analysing the repercussions sent out by domestic 
legislation within these settings. While acknowledging that bilateral and multilateral 
relations are continuously interwoven, we conclude that bilateralism accounts for a greater 
degree of normative development and proliferation than multilateralism at EU level, and 
that domestic legislation as formed by sub-regional dynamics will remain the ultimate 








With the political and legal fora of the European Union, Europe emerges as the only region 
in the world capable of launching binding legal instruments with explicit substantive and 
procedural interpretations of the broadly framed obligations under the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees.
1 In the past decade considerable attention has been paid 
to how European policy makers were translating international obligations under the 1951 
Convention into a range of innovative and controversial regional asylum practices.  
 
International lawyers are trained to think in normative and institutional hierarchies. Hence, 
there is a strong temptation to analyse EU enlargement in general, and the export of refugee 
and migration policies to the East in particular, as Brussels-driven and anchored in the 
existing acquis communautaire. In the evolving narrative, the new Member States are all 
too easily depicted as being at the receiving end of an octroi. Generally, the implementation 
of, and interplay between, international, regional and domestic law is the dominant focus of 
discourse on asylum law and policy in Europe.
2 Considering asylum against the backdrop of 
the process of European expansion, this article argues for a broader analytical framework to 
understand the development of state practice in international refugee law.
3 We believe that 
an exclusive focus on EU institutions and their dissemination of regional and international 
                                                           
1 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
In the following, reference to the 1951 Convention covers the Convention as modified by the Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees, 31 Jan. 1967, 606 UNTS 267. 
2 See e.g. Simpson, ‘Asylum and Immigration in the European Union After the Treaty of Amsterdam’, 5 
European Journal of Public Law (1999) 91; Lambert, ‘Building a European Asylum Policy Under the "First 
Pillar" of the Consolidated Treaty Establishing the European Community’, 11 International Journal of Refugee 
Law (1999) 329; Hailbronner, ‘European Immigration and Asylum Law Under the Amsterdam Treaty’, 35 
Common Market Law Review (1998) 1047; S. Peers, Mind the Gap! Ineffective Member State Implementation 
of European Union Asylum Measure (1998); van der Klaauw, ‘Refugee Protection in Western Europe: A 
UNHCR Perspective’ in J.-Y. Carlier and D. Vanheule (eds.), Europe and Refugees: A Challenge? (1997) 235-
7; Marx, ‘Non-Refoulement, Access to Procedures, and Responsibility for Determining Refugee Claims’, 7 
International Journal of Refugee Law (1995) 383. 
3 This article is developed from the methodology adopted for a collaborative study on asylum in Europe and 
the Baltic and CEEC states. The study has been published in its entirety in R. Byrne, G. Noll, and J. 
Vedsted-Hansen (eds)., New Asylum Countries? Migration Control and Refugee Protection in an Enlarged 
European Union (2002).  
 
norms is misleading. The interplay between Vienna and Budapest, Berlin and Warsaw, 
Copenhagen and Vilnius, rather than between Brussels and the candidates’ capitals has led 
to many critical developments in asylum law in an expanded European Union. Hence, to 
capture these dynamics, we will attempt to expand the framework of analysis by 
incorporating sub-regional settings, cutting across the divide between old and new 
Members.  
 
The role of the EU institutions in the development of the asylum acquis is undoubtedly a 
driving force in the later stages of the accession process. Measures to be undertaken by 
candidate countries in the fields of migration and asylum have been a dominant feature in 
their criteria for membership, requiring that the entire asylum acquis be transposed into 
their respective legal systems.
4 With formal criteria and programmes to facilitate their 
implementation in the Associated States, it is these regional multi-lateral instruments and 
measures through which the emerging asylum systems in future Member States have been 
examined in international refugee scholarship.
5 Yet by shifting the analytical focus 
downward to the sub-regional level, a more complex process of the legal development of 
European asylum law emerges. The sub-regional level comprises state-state interaction 
typically between two or three neighbouring states, as for example Austria and Hungary. 
Interaction at this level is embedded into the regional context of EU enlargement, but not 
necessarily identical in its goals. Sub-regional pressures and influences on the asylum 
regimes in the candidate countries preceded, and later, accompanied, the asylum agenda of 
the European Union for new Member States that was formalized in the accession process. In 
                                                           
4 See European Commission, ‘Acquis of the European Union under Title IV of the TEC and title VI of the 
TEU. Consolidated version 2002’, available at 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/acquis/doc_asylum_acquis_en.htm> (accessed on 
18 August 2003). 
5 See Anagnost, ‘Meeting the Needs in Central European and the Baltics: Some Preliminary Lessons Learned 
from the Successes and Failures of Three Years of Asylum System Development Work in Europe’, in 3 
European Law Reform  (2001) 29-49; Anagnost, ‘Challenges Facing Asylum System and Asylum Policy 
Development in Europe: Preliminary Lessons Learned from the Central European and Baltic States (CEBS)’, 
12 International Journal of Refugee Law (2000) 380-400; Lavenex, ‘“Passing the Buck”: European Union 
Refugee Policies towards Central and Eastern Europe’ 11 Journal of Refugee Studies (1998) 2; Lavenex, 
‘Asylum, Immigration, and Central-Eastern Europe: Challenges to Enlargement’, 3 European Foreign Affairs 
Review  (1998) 275-294; P. Nyiri, J. Toth, M. Fullerton, Diasporas and Politics (2001); F. Laczko, I. Stacher 
and A. Klekowski von Koppenfels, New Challenges for Migration Policy in Central and Eastern Europe 
(2002). For contributions from institutional actors, see e.g. ECRE, Position on the Enlargement of the 
European Union in Relation to Asylum, (1998); UNHCR, 3rd International Symposium on the Protection of 
Refugees in Central Europe, 23-25 April 1997 (1997); IOM & ICMPD, Migration in Central and Eastern 
Europe 1999 Review (1999).  
  
 
reality, norms are transformed in a constant interplay between domestic, sub-regional and 
regional forces, rather than replicated from the acquis into domestic legislation 
 
While these sub-regional effects on asylum policy within the candidate countries offer a 
more nuanced understanding of the role of the asylum acquis in the development of 
domestic asylum regimes in the East, its import extends much farther. By focussing on the 
factors that shape asylum law and practice in sub-regions, valuable insight is gained into the 
actual development of state practice in international refugee law. For the consideration of 
multi-lateral arrangements within a region, such as those that exist between the European 
Union institutions and the candidate countries, fails to illuminate the indirect effects on 
practices in contiguous jurisdictions. Multilateralism impacts not only states that are formal 
participants in the multi-lateral relationship, but neighbouring jurisdictions as well. 
 
Within this expanded framework, the evolution of asylum norms and practices can be seen 
to occur on three distinct, yet highly interdependent tiers of law and policy. On the domestic 
level, the shape of asylum law and policy is formally determined by the electorate, 
legislature and executives of a specific state.
6 Although its direct effects are on asylum 
seekers, the impact this has on their migration patterns triggers repercussions with other 
states. The consequences of rechannelled migration flows extend beyond individual states, 
directing sub-regional policy. On the sub-regional level, the development of asylum policy 
centres upon the interplay of national asylum practices between neighbouring countries, as, 
for instance, Austria and Hungary or Germany and Poland. Finally, on the regional level the 
central role in the evolution of asylum is played by the European Union, which orchestrates 
the interplay of sub-regional norms. While acknowledging that bilateral and multilateral 
relations are continuously interwoven, we conclude that bilateralism accounts for a greater 
degree of normative development and proliferation than multilateralism at EU level.  
 
                                                           
6 Guiraudon argues that “certain domestic actors bypass the process of interest aggregation by mobilizing in 
international venues” and supports this contention with examples from European harmonisation in the 
migration field. Guiraudon, ‘European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-Making as Venue 
Shopping’, 38 Journal of Common Market Studies (2000) 251-71, at p. 268.   
 
Against this backdrop, the present article seeks to explore how asylum law is formed, 
transformed and reformed in Europe, what its effects are on state practice and refugee 
protection in the Baltic and Central European candidate countries, and lastly, what this 
process reveals about the framework used by scholars to understand the dynamics of 
international refugee law. Part Two provides an overview of the development of asylum law 
in the current Member State that occurs from the 1980s to the present and divides into three 
distinct stages: formation, transformation and reform. While the dominant interaction is 
between national and regional norms and practices, sub-regional factors are identified which 
play an important role in shaping regional standards. In Parts Three and Four, the vertical 
and lateral proliferation of norms is considered respectively. Part Three contrasts the 
development of asylum law between the current and future Member States, a process which 
is most visibly governed by the Accession Partnership agreements that orchestrate the 
transfer of asylum acquis to applicant states. In Part Four, the implications of sub-regional 
factors that influence law and policy prior, and parallel, to the accession process are 
identified and considered. The conclusion will consider what the focus on sub-regional 
practice suggested here could mean for the future analysis of international refugee law. 
 
2. Refugee Law in Europe: The Three Stages of Normative Development  
 
Mandated by the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union is steadily advancing towards 
creating a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), based on a range of first pillar 
instruments to ensure a minimum level of harmonization.
7 This is the culmination of a 
fractured process occurring from 1985 onwards, attempting to reform asylum laws 
nationally and harmonize standards regionally. This development of asylum law in Western 
Europe occurred in three stages. First, in the formative stage, central norms, notions and 
principles were conceived on a domestic level. This was followed by the transformative 
stage, where these domestic norms were then regionalised within Europe. Currently, in this 
period of reform, central components of these regionalised legal instruments are being 
                                                           
7 For an overview of progress made so far, see Commission of the European Communities, ‘Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Biannual Update of the Scoreboard to 
Review Progress on the Creation of an Area Of "Freedom, Security and Justice" in the European Union (First 
Half of 2003)’, COM(2003) 291 final, Brussels, 22 May 2003.   
  
 




A. Formation: The Advent of Restrictive Asylum Policy in Europe 
 
In the formative phase, the foundation stones of the current regional asylum system in 
Western Europe were set in place by domestic legislatures. National lawmakers developed a 
number of restrictive approaches to refugee law in order to grapple with what was 
considered primarily to be a domestic problem – the perceived overburdening of national 
asylum systems. Abbreviated procedures for asylum seekers submitting claims at border 
points, or for claims deemed to be manifestly unfounded, and provisions that allowed for 
the denial of asylum claims based on notions such as the safe country of origin and safe 
third country entered into domestic laws.
9 Together with “flanking” measures moving 
migration control beyond state territory, Member States later attempted to regionalise these 
legal innovations in the harmonization instruments of the early 1990's. 
 
While harmonization appears to be a direct vertical transfer of national state practices into 
regional norms and standards over time, this simplified perspective of the process masks the 
underlying dynamics of asylum policy formation in Europe at the time. For invariably, 
innovations undertaken by individual states that aimed at preventing asylum seekers from 
entering or remaining in the territory, set a lateral spiral movement of like policies sub-
regionally, in neighboring countries.  
 
                                                           
8 See European Commission, “Towards common standards on asylum procedures,” Working Document, (SEC 
1999) 271 Final. Conclusions of the Presidency (Tampere Summit Conclusions) 15 and 16 October 1999. 
9 For an example of an early introduction of the notion of a Safe Country of Origin in Europe, see the 1990 
Swiss asylum law. Bundesbeschluss über das Asylverfahren [Federal Decision on Asylum Procedure], June 
22, 1990. The notion of safe third countries was introduced in a number of jurisdictions in the early 1990s. 
See, e.g., Austria: Bundesgesetz über die Gewährung von Asyl [Federal Law on Granting of Asylum] 
(Asylgesetz 1991), reported in Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich [Federal Gazette for the 
Republic of Austria] (Jan. 7, 1992), pt. 2, ch. 1, sec. 2(3); Canada: Immigration Act, sec. 46.01(1)(b); 
Denmark: Udlaendingeloven [Aliens Act], Art. 48, para. 2; France: Arts. 31 and 31 bis, Ordinance No. 45-
2658, Nov. 2, 1945, in the version of Law No. 93-1027, Aug. 24, 1993; Germany: Law to amend the Basic 
Law (Grundgesetz; arts. 16 and 18), June 28, 1993: Bundesgesetzblatt 1993, 1002; United Kingdom: Asylum 
and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, HC para. 180K, 180M.  
 
Contemporary political debates on asylum, in the West and East, echo the fears of earlier 
governments to be targeted by asylum seekers as a “soft touch” unless they introduce the 
restrictive policies of their neighbours.
10 This inspired domestic legislatures in neighboring 
states to incorporate restrictive practices into their own asylum laws. Specifically, frontier 
states as Austria anticipated that with the permeability of their Eastern borders combined 
with the introduction of safe third country policies in neighboring Western European states, 
they would be confronted with high numbers of asylum seekers.
11 They would risk 
becoming a “closed sack” for asylum migration unless they themselves, in turn, could return 
asylum seekers to a third “host state.” These fears were precipitated by the potential sub-
regional effects on migration patterns perceived to result from the national asylum practices 
of neighboring states.  They remain an underlying theme throughout the period where 
restrictive asylum policies rippled across Europe. From this vantage point, the transmission 
of restrictive policies and practices, and of the apprehensions that inspired them, was lateral.  
 
The formative stage started in 1986 with the introduction of the safe third country notion 
into Danish legislation (known as the Danish clause)
12. The idea that states could remove an 
asylum seeker to another jurisdiction on the grounds that protection could be sought 
elsewhere, quickly gained ground. Its implementation by one state within a sub-region, gave 
impetus for neighboring jurisdictions to follow suit, inspiring the fear within states of 
                                                           
10 Not long ago, the Austrian Minister Strasser told media that Austria would not accept becoming the primary 
goal country of “economic refugees” just because other EU Members are legislating in a more restrictive 
manner. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, ‘Verschärftes Asylrecht in Österreich’ [“Increasingly restrictive 
asylum legislation in Austria”], 12 June 2003, 5. While the rhetoric of states being a “soft touch” draws on 
projections of asylum seekers as rational actors maximizing procedural and welfare advantages, such a simple 
nexus cannot be shown in a quantitative analysis. Against the backdrop of a quantitative study of determinants 
affecting the choice of country by asylum seekers, Thielemann has convincingly argued that legislative policies 
of deterrence (such as safe third country schemes) have often proved ineffective. See E. Thielemann, “Does 
Policy Matter? On Governments’ Attempts to Control Unwanted Migration”, EI Working Paper 2003-02, 
available at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/europeanInstitute/workingpaperindex.htm> (accessed on 25 
August 2003).  
11 Austria is a particularly instructive example, where both the Eastern and Western dimensions crystallised 
into distinct legislative waves. In 1990, Austria responded to the abolishment of the Iron Curtain with 
extremely harsh legislation (justified as an emergency measure), to then launch a new legislative package in 
1997 reacting to EU Membership, the adoption of the Schengen acquis and the 1998 entry into force of the 
Dublin Convention in Austria. Brandl, ‘Austria’, in R. Byrne et al., supra note 3, 100. 
12 The Danish legislature launched this radically formalistic solution in 1986, reacting on what it perceived as 
an uncontrolled inflow of applicants transiting through the then German Democratic Republic and, 
consecutively, the Federal Republic of Germany. By virtue of the Danish clause, asylum seekers could be sent 
back to safe third countries, and appeals had no suspensive effect. The safety of countries was identified in 
administrative practice.  
  
 
becoming a “closed sack” from which asylum seekers and migrants could not be removed. 
By the end of the 1990's, virtually every Western European state implemented a safe third 
country policy to transfer responsibility for receiving an asylum seeker and assessing their 
claim. Although the European Court of Human Rights
13 and national courts
14 acknowledge 
that its implementation potentially may breach the prohibitions of refoulement in 
international law, limited powers of judicial review and a reticent and delayed stand on the 
issue by UNHCR has rendered the safe third country practice one of the most successful of 
the controversial practices adopted in the formative stage.
15 Some 20 years after its 
inception, it is about to enter the domain of supranational hard law
16, illustrative of how the 
proliferation of core asylum notions spread from the bottom-up, rather than from the top-
down. The London Resolution of 1992 on Host Third Countries is conveniently thought of 
as the starting point for the notion of safe third country, thus moving the focus on a regional 
level dominated by “soft” policy making. The Danish clause demonstrates that its story 
starts six years earlier and demonstrates the need for an expanded method of inquiry. 
Although the adaptation of legislation was often motivated with a reference to the acquis – 
and thus to the regional process – in national policy debates, the dire necessity to adapt 
domestic law then and there was rather a result of concrete sub-regional pressures. 
 
                                                           
13 In T.I. vs the UK, the Third Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found “that the indirect 
removal in this case to an intermediary country, which is also a Contracting State, does not affect the 
responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the applicant is not, as a result of its decision to expel, 
exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Nor can the United Kingdom rely automatically 
in that context on the arrangements made in the Dublin Convention concerning the attribution of responsibility 
between European countries for deciding asylum claims”. Given the specifics of the case, and assurances by 
Germany that it would look into the merits of the claim by T.I. once he were returned by the U.K. under the 
Dublin Convention, the Court found the application to be inadmissible. Decision as to the Admissibility of 
Application No. 43844/98 by T.I. against the U.K., ECtHR (Third Chamber), 7 March 2000 (unpublished), 16. 
14 In the landmark case of Adan and Aitseguer, the U.K. House of Lords held that the true interpretation of the 
1951 Convention must be taken as a standard for assessing the legality of removal under the Dublin 
Convention. Regina v. Secretary of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte Adan. Regina v. Secretary of 
State For The Home Department, Ex Parte Aitseguer, U.K. House of Lords, Judgments of 19 December 2000, 
available at <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldjudgmt/jd001219/adan-1.htm > 
(accessed on 1 January 2001). 
15 For an overview how far the notion of safe third country had spread already by the end of the 1990s, see N. 
Lassen, Safe Third Country Policies in European Countries (Copenhagen: Danish Refugee Council) (1997). 
For a more recent overview, see S. Egan, K. Costello, Refugee Law. A Comparative Study. Report 
Commissioned by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (1999). 
16 See Commission Of the European Communities, ‘Amended proposal for a Council directive on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status’, Brussels, 18.6.2002, 
COM(2002) 326 final, arts. 27-8 and Annex I.  
 
The impact of German legislative changes on its neighbours provides a powerful illustration 
of this point. In Germany, the formative stage peaked in 1993 with the comprehensive 
limitation of the right to asylum in the German Constitution
17, incorporating a “hard” 
version of the safe third country concept lacking suspensive effect, introducing the notion 
of safe country of origin and launching an accelerated airport determination  procedure. The 
repercussions of these amendments and their 1996 affirmation by the Federal Constitutional 
Court
18 were again amplified sub-regionally and rippled through a number of neighboring 
states in the following years. In Poland, the parliament incorporated safe country notions 
into the 1997 Aliens Act.  Notably, the Polish safe third country criteria directly mirror 
those employed by the German legislature and the German Federal Constitutional Court.
19 
In Hungary, the German moves were closely followed and “seen as a confirmatory licence to 
introduce safe country rules”.
20 By contrast, “[t]he Union as such (as distinct from its 
Member States) had little direct impact on the Hungarian refugee policy. No serious 
negotiations on Justice and Home Affairs were held until 1996, and even afterwards 
attention was focused on prevention of illegal border crossings, cooperation against 
organized crime and harmonization of visa policies.”
21 Most strikingly, the Hungarian 
regulation of the safe third country notion cannot be explained merely with resort to the 
London Resolution on Host Third Countries of 1992, which does not list accession to the 
ECHR as a criterion for safety. The Hungarian regulation does, and is emulating German 
and Austrian practice rather than the abstract and imprecise formulations in the acquis.
22  
 
Since 1993, there have been no radically new norms or practices conceived by domestic 
lawmakers. A testament, perhaps, to the fact that the development of new restrictive 
concepts had reached a point of saturation. The current practice is for states to amend their 
                                                           
17 For a brief presentation, see Noll, ‘The Non-admission and Return of Protection Seekers in Germany’ 9 
International Journal of Refugee Law (1997) 415, with further references in note 128.  
18 BVerfGE 94, 49. See also Noll, ibid. For an extensive commentary on the judgement: R. Marx, Urteile des 
BverfG vom 14. Mai 1996 mit Erläuterungen. Ergänzungsband zum Kommentar zum Asylverfahrensgesetz, 
(1996). 
19 Micolajczyk, ‘Poland’, in Byrne et al. supra note 3, 68-71. 
20 Nagy, ‘Hungary’, in R. Byrne et al., supra note 3, 138-99, at p. 165. 
21 Nagy, ibid., at 165. 
22 For details, see Nagy, ibid.,  at 182.  
  
 
asylum practices by experimenting with various formulations of existing concepts
23, or by 
simply importing those already implemented by their neighbours.  
 
B. Transformation: From Bilateral Proliferation to Regional Harmonization 
 
Attempts by European immigration ministers to harmonize asylum law ushered in the 
transformative phase in regional asylum policy. The product of this was the range of 
piecemeal agreements, and instruments, most of them soft law, that comprised the asylum 
acquis communautaire that candidate countries are compelled to implement in order to fulfil 
the criteria for admission to the European Union.
24 It is this period that transformed 
controversial state practices, as well as important minimum guarantees, from national 
refugee law into a regionalised body of instruments. The initial developments of the 
transformative stage overlapped in time with the formative stage and significantly, with the 
pre-accession process.  
 
From the signing of the Dublin and Schengen Conventions in 1990
25, until 1999, when the 
Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, the creation of regional instruments was carried out 
in intergovernmental fora and largely behind closed doors. The bulk of this regional 
framework was constructed as “soft law”. It encompassed a substratum of widely 
implemented European practices which seek to deter and deflect the arrival of asylum 
seekers, provide guidelines for minimum guarantees for those asylum claimants who 
actually succeed in entering Western Europe, and establish mechanisms for expediting the 
processing of their applications. While progress towards a harmonized asylum policy was 
slow, staggered and widely critiqued, a hard core of the European asylum acquis started to 
                                                           
23 The so-called Pacific Solution, implemented by Australia, is an extreme form of migration control through 
proxy states, sharing the ideology of “remote control” described in this article. It aims at the redirection of all 
boat arrivals from Australian mainland to offshore processing locations. The UK proposals of Spring 2003 
represent an attempt to import this model into the European theatre. With the political support of Denmark and 
the Netherlands, the UK aim at launching offshore Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones, and to 
redirect spontaneously arriving asylum seekers there.  
24Supra note 4. 
25Convention applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual 
Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 19 June 1990. Convention Determining the State Responsible 
for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the Community, Dublin, 15 
June 1990. [hereinafter Dublin Convention]. Entered into force 1 September 1997. OJ 1997 C 254/1.  
 
emerge. By means of Chapter VII of the Schengen Convention, later to be replaced by the 
Dublin Convention, binding legal obligations were assumed by Member States in order to 
create an effective system for allocating responsibility among Member States for 
determining a claim for refugee status. These two treaties established systems that operated 
upon the assumption that all Member States offered equivalent levels of protection from 
refoulement under the 1951 Convention; an assumption left largely unchallenged until court 
decisions from the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights.
26 
 
In the transformative stage, the objective of harmonization was to bring about a 
convergence of national asylum practices. The European Commission and the Council of 
Ministers recognized that by the late 1990's effective harmonization to create a common 
asylum system had not been successful.
27 The greatest obstacle to the effectiveness of the 
rudimentary steps undertaken towards harmonization in this period was the fact that both 
binding and non-binding norms were fraught with idiosyncrasies
28 and thus invited 
application in a different manner and to a varying degree by Member States.
29 The failure to 
effectively standardize practices to ensure equitable treatment of asylum seekers throughout 
the current membership of the European Union has created one of the most significant 
challenges to refugee protection in the region.  
 
The intergovernmental efforts at harmonizing European asylum law failed to produce the 
legal norms and mechanisms to ensure a comprehensive and coherent regional approach to 
asylum. Yet during this period the restrictive notions and devices reflected in the non-
binding instruments of the acquis became entrenched into state practice across Europe. The 
                                                           
26 See note 13 and 14 respectively. 
27 This has been explicitly acknowledged by the European Commission in 2000: ‘Substantive asylum law and 
asylum procedures have not yet been approximated and the recognition rates for certain nationalities can vary 
significantly from one Member State to another, so it is understandable that people in need of international 
protection may find one Member State a more attractive destination than another’. European Commission, 
Commission staff working paper. Revisiting the Dublin Convention: developing Community legislation for 
determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum submitted in one of 
the Member States, SEC (2000) 522, 21 March 2000, para. 30. 
28 See, e.g., Bank, ‘The Emergent EU Policy on Asylum and Refugees. The New Framework Set by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam: Landmark or Standstill?’, 68 NJIL (1999) 8. 
29 The most striking example is perhaps the persistent variation in domestic legislation on the notion of safe 
third country, acknowledged in a study carried out by the Council of Ministers. These differences remained, 
although two soft law instruments had embarked on “harmonisation”. See Council of the European Union, 
‘Monitoring the implementation of instruments adopted concerning asylum—Summary report of the Member  
  
 
steady wave of national legislative reforms may be attributed to the adoption of instruments 
which attempted to harmonize these practices within the European Community, and later, 
the European Union. As indicated above, it is tempting to credit the spread of safe third 
country practices during this period to the abstract and non-binding 1992 London Resolution 
on Host Third Countries. The tangibility of the Brussels dictate offered by the London 
Resolution make it a ready point of reference for analysts tracing regional asylum policy, 




Although the political justifications for asylum reforms during this period pointed to the 
need to bring domestic policy in line with European initiatives, this overt reference to the 
emerging acquis deceptively masks the role of sub-regional dynamics in shaping state 
practice. As policy analysts examining asylum in Europe in this period observe, restrictive 
policies were legitimated in public political discourse by the need to participate in the EU 
asylum and migration regime, creating “strange bedfellows” in political terms.
31 Ministers 
and civil servants were able to draft instruments that reflected their own domestic 
immigration and asylum agendas behind closed doors. They then were able to utilize these 
instruments as a tool in advancing their positions in domestic political fora.
32 In Hungary, 
“the shadows of the Union and its acquis loomed large after prospects for accession became 
realistic”
33, with government officials and MPs referring to “EU practice” as if it contained a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
States’ replies to the questionnaire launched in 1997’, 17 July 1998, Doc. No. 8886/98, ASIM 139, pp. 23–31. 
30 According to Thielemann, the “emerging EU migration regime was useful to those in the Kohl government 
who had long sought domestic reform and who now started to justify their restrictive policy proposal by 
arguing that Germany's participation in the European regime required constitutional amendment. This 
argument was repeatedly made by respective Ministers of the Interior from Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU) to 
Wolfgang Schäuble and Rudolf Seiters in the late 1980s and early 1990s.” E. Thielemann, “The “Soft” 
Europeanisation of Migration Policy: European Integration and Domestic Policy Change”, Paper presented at 
the 2002 ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March, available at 
<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/turin/ws3/3_thielemann.pdf> (accessed on 25 
August 2003), p. 20. 
31 As Guiraudon observes against the backdrop of specific examples from the early 1990s, liberal pro-EU 
politicians could not disapprove of calls for European migration control harmonization coming from anti-EU 
restrictionist politicians. Guiraudon, supra note 6, at 261. 
32 For a theoretically informed analysis of this form of “venue shopping” and its manipulative use by interior 
and justice ministries, see Guiraudon, supra note 6. See also E. Thielemann, forthcoming “The 
Europeanisation of Asylum Policy: Overcoming International and Domestic Institutional Constraints” Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies; Lavenex (1998), supra note 5.  
33 Nagy, supra note 20, at 165, quoting an example from parliamentary proceedings.  
 
tangible and precise standard with which Hungarian legislation must conform. Reflective of 
the general perception in the Baltics, the adoption of the acquis was perceived as an entry 
ticket writ large to Western integration and a new security framework.
34 Faced with such 
existential arguments, who would argue that the country engaged in an excessively zealous 
adaptation of European practice, the costs of which were to be paid by refugees? 
 
Looking beneath the level of the multi-lateral agreements that emerged from Brussels during 
the transformation stage, there were two overlapping legal processes underway in Europe. 
Sub-regional transformation which was most marked since 1993 onwards, and regional 
transformation, which started to gain momentum in the mid-nineties with the successive 
entry into force of the Schengen and Dublin Conventions in 1995 and 1997 respectively.
35 
Yet in spite of these two separate processes, analysis remained focussed on regional 
instruments, mistakenly collapsing the two processes into one. The consequence is that the 
EU multi-lateral agreements and resolutions are identified as the cause of the transformation 
of asylum in Europe. In  reality, they are merely the symptoms of a broader sub-regional 
spread phenomenon which generated the dissemination of policies such as “safe third 
country” and procedures for “manifestly unfounded claims”.  
There are two casualties resulting from a perspective that is focussed on the vertical 
interaction between national and regional law. The first casualty is academic discourse 
whereby the development of regional state practice is misunderstood. The second casualty is 
democratic process, whereby the perception of a Brussels dictate, when it may not yet exist 
in fact, serves as a mechanism for domestic policy makers to legitimate asylum practices that 
were inspired by sub-regional incentives and pressures, rather than by claimed regional 
principles. 
 
C. Reform: Re-Constructing the Framework for Asylum in Europe 
 
The transformative period produced a first acquis, still leaving much leeway for policy 
divergences amongst Member States. A second acquis is now in the making, said to create a 
Common European Asylum System throughout the European Union. This will be the first 
body of asylum instruments of its kind, and create binding and enforceable obligations for 
                                                           
34 Potisepp, ‘Estonia’, in Byrne et al., supra note 3, at 282.  
  
 
states, that may some day number 27, in the European Union. Its preparation has been 
mainly undertaken by the European Commission, which was equipped with the right to 
initiative under the Amsterdam Treaty.
36 The proposals originally tabled by the Commission 
generally reflect a more protection-minded approach than the first Maastricht acquis. Some 
of the more robust safeguards of the Commission’s proposal have already been amended and 
diluted; hence, the protection concerns in the East created by the weaknesses of the first 
acquis may remain with the introduction of its successor under the Amsterdam Treaty.
37 
Ironically, the current misperception of a binding Brussels dictate may very well be an 
adequate framework of analysis once the second Amsterdam acquis is negotiated and in 
force. At present, domestic legislation is sending norms to, rather than receiving them from, 
the asylum acquis. With the Common European Asylum System moving into a more 
ambitious phase, the opposite may be the case.  
 
However, the creation of the Common European Asylum System does not stop with the 
battery of instruments to be adopted until 2004. Already before all building blocks are in 
place, thinking on reconstructing the whole edifice has started. With a ”second phase” of the 
CEAS now envisaged there will be a further intrusion on the residual competency of 
Member States. A number of factors will affect the negotiations of ”second phase”-
instruments; the most prominent of which will be the outcome of the 2003/2004 IGC. Since 
the Treaty of Nice, the spectre of transition to Qualified Majority Voting and the codecision 
procedure under Article 251 TEC also looms large. However, an automatic transition will 
take place only in limited areas, and further political decisions by an unanimous Council are 
required to subject core competencies for the development of the CEAS to the codecision 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
35 See the impact on Austria, note 11 above. 
36 For the time being, this right is shared with the Member States, as stipulated in Art. 67 TEC. As a notable 
exception from the standard practice of Commission initiatives, France proposed four controversial measures 
building further on the Schengen acquis during its 2000 presidency (carrier sanctions, mutual recognition of 
expulsion decisions, the criminalisation of facilitating illegal entry, residence and movement, and the 
exploitation of persons).  
37 The most striking example is the dilution of procedural safeguards for protection seekers by the Commission. 
See ‘Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status’, COM (2002) 326. This proposal replaced a more protection-minded 
one presented in 2000. At time of writing, further dilution had taken place in the legislative process in the 
Council of Ministers.  
 
procedure.
38 In particular, a transition in core areas would presuppose that “the common 
rules and basic principles governing these issues”
39 have been defined, which can arguably 
be understood to imply that the first phase of the CEAS has to be complete. At the time of 
writing, this is not the case. To the extent that the codecision procedure is activated in the 
future, the European Parliament will rise from a mere consultative body to an actor with 
considerable power, with the voting behaviour of the new MEPs remaining an open 
question. No matter what the precise outcome of this transition process is going to be, the 
new Members will be on board when it takes effect. Forging a qualified majority in an 
enlarged club may prove as difficult as reaching consensus in the circle of old Members.  
Reasonably, the CEAS has a chance to emancipate itself from the heritage of sub-regional 
norms and move from a state-centrist perspective towards an institutionalist-unionist one 
only when it has shifted into the second phase. If, and only if, that stage is reached, lateral 
proliferation will turn into a vertical legislative process in the proper sense of the term, and 
the current misperception of the “Brussels dictate” will become an accurate metaphor. Not 
necessarily for long, however. To the extent the European Parliament is allowed to engage 
in legislation, there will be a need for a new conceptual framework for understanding the 
development of regional asylum policy. 
                                                           
38 Only one subject matter is certain to move from consensus to Qualified Majority Voting: on 1 May 2004, 
administrative cooperation according to art. 66 TEC will be decided through Qualified Majority Voting after 
consultation of the European Parliament (Protocol on Article 67 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 24 December 2002, OJ C 325/184). As provided in Article 67 (4), measures on the issuing of 
visas under art. 62 (2) (b) (ii) and (iv) shall be automatically transferred to the co-decision procedure, as 
already stipulated in the Treaty of Amsterdam. With all respect due to the importance of visas and 
administrative cooperation, neither area is at the heart of the Common European Asylum System and changes 
in decision-taking will have marginal effect. The transition of the important competencies to Qualified 
Majority Voting or codecision is, however, contingent on political agreement on several levels: 
•  Regarding all measures under art. 63 (1) and (2) (a) TEC, a precondition for transition to the 
codecision procedure is that the Council has previously adopted Community legislation “defining the 
common rules and basic principles governing these issues” (art. 67 (5), 1
st indent TEC). Obviously, it 
is open to argument when the acquis has reached that qualitative threshold. 
•  Regarding measures relating to external border control under art. 62 (2) (a) TEC, the codecision 
procedure shall be triggered by a Council decision from the date on which agreement is reached on 
the scope of the measures concerning the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member 
States (art. 67 (2) TEC; Declaration on Article 67 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 10 March 2001, OJ C 80/78). 
•  According to a rather vague statement of intent, the Council will, moreover, “endeavour to make the 
procedure referred to in Article 251 applicable from 1 May 2004 or as soon as possible thereafter to 
the other areas covered by Title IV or to parts of them”. It should be noted that the more committing 
statement of intent in the first indent of the declaration does not relate to core areas of asylum 
harmonization. (Declaration on Article 67 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 10 
March 2001, OJ C 80/78). 
39 Art. 67 (5) 1




3. Accession and Asylum   
 
The pre-eminence of the acquis in this transformation phase, is highlighted in the 
parallel process of accession. The candidate countries were anticipating, and then formally 
applying for membership to the EU in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Of the 
Visegrad Group,
40 Hungary and Poland applied for membership in 1994, followed by 
Slovakia in 1995 and the Czech Republic in 1996.
41 Each of the states of the Baltic Sea 
Region, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, submitted their applications in 1995.
42 Admission 
criteria require that the Associated States engage in extensive political, judicial, legislative 
and institutional reforms. Even prior to their formal applications for membership into the 
European Union, applicant states undertook to approximate their legislation to that of the 
European Union in the bi-lateral European Agreement (EA) with the European 
Communities as part of the pre-accession process.  
 
Although the body of the asylum acquis was predominantly composed of “soft law” and 
therefore largely non-binding for the current Members, admission criteria transformed the 
content of the collection of resolutions and conclusions into de facto obligations for the 
applicant states.
43 In the early 1990's the newly democratized states were confronted with 
having to provide legal and policy responses to the growing transit migration of asylum 
seekers aiming to enter Western Europe. Yet while current Member States in Western 
Europe engaged in this process during the formative stage of asylum developments from the 
middle of the 1980's and onwards, the accession process trumped the potential for applicant 
states to progress through an independent formative stage. With an eye to membership, their 
                                                           
40  The Visegrad Group consists of Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics. Previously known 
as the Visegrad Triangle, prior to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, it derives its name from a meeting of its 
member states to co-ordinate their positions with respect to the then, European Community, held in 1991 in 
Visegrad, Hungary. 
41 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, Apr. 1994, point 1.3.18; point 1.3.19; BULL. EUR. UNION, June 1995, 
point 1.4.58; BULL. EUR. UNION, Jan.-Feb. 1996, point 1.4.75. 
42BULL. EUR. UNION, Nov. 1995, point 1.4.60; BULL. EUR. UNION, Oct. 1995, point 1.4.42; BULL. 
EUR. UNION, Dec. 1995, point 1.4.60. 
43 This is a standard observation by researchers looking at the enlargement process. See, e.g., Potisepp, supra 
note 34, at 300, observing that the acquis does not oblige the current Members to “do much”, yet it is a “take it 
or leave it”-condition for aspiring Members.   
 
respective asylum legislation was to be designed in line with the blue print of the first 
acquis. Soon into the accession process, refugee policy emerged as an increasingly 
significant area for co-operation given its links to broader issues of external border control 
and security issues. Regional acknowledgment of the need to have a coherent strategy with 
respect to asylum and the accession process was recognized by the 1994 European Council 
in Essen.
44 This call was met by limited exchanges between EU Ministers of Justice and 
Home Affairs with their counterparts in applicant states which dealt with a range of issues 
such as visa policies, cross border crime, human trafficking, as well as asylum.
45 
 
Explicit criteria for applicant states in asylum and refugee matters were set forth by the 
European Commission in its 1997 communication, Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider 
Europe
46. These are: 
 
1.  adoption in new Member States of the Geneva Convention and its necessary 
implementing machinery; 
2.  adoption of the Dublin Convention; 
3.  adoption of related measures in the EU acquis to approximate asylum measures.
47    
  
 
While this transfer of the regional asylum system to the East has centred upon the first 
acquis, fulfilling the ‘obligations of membership’ entails the implementation of the entire 
EU acquis as it evolves. This is particularly relevant in the area of asylum policy as in the 
absence of a full-fledged acquis in the area of asylum, narrowly, and justice and home 
affairs, more generally, applicant states are committed in principle to implementing a yet to 
be constructed comprehensive framework for refugee protection. The applicant states have 
played no formal role in the creation of the second acquis which is likely to be in force by 
the time of the admission of the first round of states in 2004. Unlike their Western European 
                                                           
44 Conclusions of the Presidency (Essen Summit Conclusions) reprinted in BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, 
Dec. 1994, point I.13. 
45 See Lavenex, ‘”Passing the Buck”: European Union Refugee Policies towards Central and Eastern Europe’, 
11 J. Ref. Studies (1998) 134-137. 
46 COM (97) 2000 final/1. 
47 Ibid.  
  
 
counterparts, candidate countries had no opportunity to inscribe their own domestic norms 
on refugees and migration into the first and second acquis.  
 
Most clearly expressed in the EU accession process, the development of asylum policy in 
the applicant countries occurred with significant constraints upon their sovereignty as they 
underwent the process of democratic transition. The quest for membership in the European 
Union entails a dependency on Western neighbours and requires that applicant states adopt 
and implement the asylum acquis. This dependency is channelled into specific 
organisational structures for asylum system development. Central is a process known as 
Phare Horizontal Asylum (PHA), consisting of five phases of round tables, and bringing 
together seven Member States, ten candidates, the Commission and UNHCR.
48  
 
The accession process largely has been underway during the transformative stage, which 
has a significant impact on refugee protection in the East. The period is characterized by the 
failure to produce a comprehensive and coherent common asylum system. In spite of the 
endemic shortcomings of existing soft law that made it particularly unsuitable for export to 
candidate countries, both the Commission and a group of engaged Member States exercised 
considerable efforts for its wholesale transfer to the candidate states.
49 This situation gives 
rise to the current paradox, where one Directorate of the European Commission is 
addressing the weaknesses of the asylum acquis in the process of reconstructing Europe’s 
refugee protection framework, while another Directorate is mandating the comprehensive 
adoption of the very same acquis by Eastern candidate states in the process of accession. 
 
The accession process, however, has encouraged significant advances in refugee protection 
in the frontier states to the European Union. There have undoubtedly been protection 
benefits derived from converging the process of accession with that of harmonization.
50 By 
                                                           
48 For a detailed description, see Anagnost (2001), supra note 5; Petersen, ‘Recent Developments in Central 
Europe and the Baltic States in the Asylum Field: A View from UNHCR and the Strategies of the High 
Commissioner for Enhancing the Asylum Systems of the Region’, in Byrne et al., supra note 3, 351-372. 
49 The PHA was funded by the Community budget and cost EUR 3 Million. The German Federal Office for 
the Recognition of Refugees acted as a lead agency, which reflects the interest by threshold countries as 
Germany. For further details on the PHA, see Anagnost (2001), supra note 5, at 31. 
50 The accession to the 1951 Convention and the introduction of domestic asylum legislation are tangible 
advantages, on which all further developments will come to rest. Consider the 1998 revocation of the  
 
transferring elements of the EU asylum acquis communautaire to applicant states asylum 
determination systems have been introduced in these jurisdictions which are accompanied 
by some of the fundamental safeguards common to aspects of Western European practices.  
 
Yet there the transfer of minimum standards from the regional instruments in Western 
Europe has highlighted the challenge to protecting refugee rights under treaties and 
instruments when they are transposed across divergent legal systems. In the newly 
democratized states the asylum acquis is implemented in a different legal and political 
environment than in Member States, where it was created. The negotiations for accession 
themselves reveal an official recognition of sharp divides between East and West in the 
advancement of legal and administrative systems, infrastructure and resources, experience 
of civil society in monitoring state practice and advocacy efforts for reform, and the social 
services and political stability to cope with the added pressures of integrating an increasing 
population of non-nationals.  
 
Implementing the asylum acquis in the less developed asylum systems of the candidate 
countries raises protection problems. The integrity of border procedures, and the quality of 
first and second instance decision-taking are cases in point. The most serious issue with 
respect to transferring the acquis during the transformative stage rests with the assessment 
of the gaps in protection that it allows. The reformative stage provided the EU institutions, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), commentators and 
advocates, the opportunity to acknowledge officially that there are fault lines in the regional 
protection system constructed through the process of harmonizing asylum law in Western 
Europe.
51   
 
This recognition has greater significance when considering that the acquis is transferred 
from the advanced asylum systems in the West, to the nascent structures in the East. The 
risk of compromised protection standards undoubtedly increases when the acquis is applied 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention by Hungary, which can be read as a response to mainly 
Western European pressures.  
51Although there is a considerable range of views about the nature of the short-comings of the current acquis 
and their significance with respect to protection, official statements and publications from all of these parties 
reflect agreement on the need for the current weaknesses in harmonized asylum system of the European Union  
  
 
in the applicant states. This is illustrated by looking at three types of practices set forth in 
the acquis, safe third country practices and procedures for claims submitted at borders, and 
those for claims deemed to be “manifestly unfounded.”  
 
First, it is difficult within the near future to envisage Belarus, Russia or Ukraine as safe 
third countries in the formal sense. Hence, for candidate countries, the enactment of safe 
third country norms would seem a useless exercise at best. Yet, they invite abuse. The 
conclusion of readmission agreements between candidate states and their Eastern 
neighbours opens “windows of opportunity”, with no attendant safeguards for protection 
seekers. Border claims appear to represent a grey zone in many of the emergent asylum 
systems, with border guards enjoying considerable margins for rejecting persons. This 
replicates lacunae in the acquis, which does not propose safeguards in readmission 
agreements, and cannot compensate lacking legal infrastructure and training of border 
guards. 
 
Second, admission to territory does not necessarily mean admissibility to the asylum 
procedure. By way of example, persons could be denied access to the asylum procedure on 
grounds related to excludability, public security or lacking credibility under the Lithuanian 
legislation and practice of the late Nineties.
52 Writing in his personal capacity, Michael 
Petersen has voiced concerns on the “channelling of asylum applications into admissibility 
procedures on formal grounds” such as “lack of documentation” and  “exceeding of time 
limits for filing claims.”
53 UNHCR has formally voiced concern about the collapsing of safe 
third country cases into a category of abusive or manifestly unfounded claims, mixing 
formal aspects of admissibility with material issues of protection need.
54 
  
The emerging European system requires confidence that it is capable of imposing uniform 
standards of protection across the varied legal systems of Western Europe. This is a pre-
requisite for implementing the migration policies of the collective and individual Member 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to be remedied through the process of reform mandated under the Amsterdam Treaty. 
52 Sesickas, Siniovas, Urbelis and Vysockiene, ‘Lithuania’, in Byrne et al., supra note 3, at 236. 
53 Petersen, supra note 48, at 370. 
54 UNHCR, ‘Background Paper nr. 2. The Application of the “safe third country” notion and its impact on the   
 
States. As stated above, the European Court of Human Rights and the British House of 
Lords have both cast doubt on the sustainability of that assumption which is the bedrock of 
the Dublin Convention and its successor regulation. This does not even consider the 
diversity of standards that is a feature of the asylum systems in the new asylum states, the 
very states that are compelled to become part of the Dublin regime as a condition of 
membership of the European Union. The Commission identifies one of the primary 
objectives in requiring the implementation of the first acquis for candidate states seeking 
membership as the enlargement of the pool of potential third countries to which asylum 
seekers can be returned to have their claims considered. If the Members of the European 
Union are to benefit from this expanded pool of host third countries that are the new asylum 
states, and avoid responsibility for breaches of the 1951 Convention, one would have to 
accept that the first acquis and sub-regional policies have already succeeded in constructing 
a regional refugee system that can guarantee protection in the West and East.  
 
When this regime from the West is transferred to the transitional legal and administrative 
infrastructures in the newly democratized states in the East, the strains on the fault lines of 
this transposed regional asylum system further widen the gaps in protection, creating 
genuine risks in certain circumstances that refugees may be directly, or indirectly, subject to 
refoulement. The asylum agenda for the applicant countries under the formal accession 
process is directed by a tunnel vision which is focussed on the transfer of the asylum acquis. 
There is a notable absence in any official communications from the European Union 
concerning accession offering consideration of the shortcomings of the asylum acquis. Yet 
it is these deficiencies that are so pronounced as to have mandated that the system be 
reconstructed by the European Commission pursuant to the Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
As a Common European Asylum System is about to be introduced the outcome of the 
reformative stage will have ramifications for the newly joined members of the European 
Union. Different from the older Member States, they will have implemented the first 
version of the acquis in the course of the accession process. This will invariably make them 
unwilling to remodel their domestic legislation again. This process will take place when 
enlargement has begun, and the complexity of decision-making will grow exponentially, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
management of flows and on the protection of refugees’, (2001), at 2.  
  
 
unless qualified majority voting has been introduced. Thus, after enlargement, any attempts 
to develop the acquis in a more liberal direction will need to overcome the new Member 
States’ affinity to the first version of the acquis. To be sure, the present Member States will 
lose much of their bargaining power vis-à-vis the candidate states, once they have been 
admitted to the club. 
 
The regional focus on the development of state practice in applicant states centres on formal 
instruments and programmes of the European Union. It demonstrates the dynamics of 
refugee policy formation between the European Union and its future members, revealing 
differences between the West and East in the means by which asylum systems have been 
created, and the effects that this has on refugee protection in the new asylum states. This, in 
and of itself, raises interesting issues about the advancement of democracy and the value of 
the political process in the formulation of human rights related policies. It also challenges 
deeper assumptions about the capacity of certain norms and standards to guarantee 
fundamental human rights when applied across a varied range of jurisdictions. 
 
4: The Implications of Sub-Regional Transformation  
 
So far, we have identified different processes impacting on how asylum and migration 
norms were conceived in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Baltics. We claim that 
these processes at times pushed in the same direction, yet also brought about incoherence 
and contradiction. The following section tracks the implications of sub-regional factors 
that influence law and policy prior, and parallel, to the accession process, and argues that 
the outcomes in some areas, by necessity, were incoherent and even contradictory to the 
stated motive of “harmonisation”.  
 
Unlike the vertical interactions between regional and domestic asylum law that 
characterizes the analysis above, the transformation of asylum law sub-regionally centres 
upon the transfer of policies –and the influence of their implementation – laterally. A 
feature of the formative and transformative stages in Western Europe, it nonetheless has 
been overshadowed by the vertical interactions between domestic and regional norms. This  
 
analysis is not only circumscribed by its vertical perspective, but limits our view to the 
states within the formal European Union framework of Member and Associated States.   
 
An examination of the sub-regional transformation of asylum policy requires a review of 
policy development that is less easily identifiable than that offered by the harmonizing 
instruments on the European level. By 2000, all of the states in the Southern, the Central 
and the Northern sub-regions either introduced or amended laws and policies affecting 
asylum seekers and refugees.
55 Independent of the formal criteria laid down by the 
accession process, there were three sub-regional factors that were strong determinants in 
shaping the emerging asylum regimes in the newly democratized states. These are the 
dialectical process of restrictive measures and counter measures, the conditionalities 
imposed by individual Member States, and the contagious and politically persuasive 
imagery of the “soft touch” and the “closed sack”. 
 
The dialectical process of restrictive measures and counter-measures is a prevailing 
dynamic in the evolution of asylum policies in all of the three sub-regions. Yet the 
distinctive features within a sub-region explain different directions in state practice aimed at 
deterring and deflecting asylum seekers. While a regional analysis would trace the selected 
mechanisms for non-arrival policies and pre-procedure exclusions to the instruments of the 
acquis, it is unable to explain why in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, in the Central 
link, and Austria and Hungary in the Southern link, the pull was towards pre-procedure 
exclusions, while in Scandinavia and the Baltics, in the Northern link, state practice moved 
towards non-arrival policies, 
 
As argued above, the candidates in the Central and the Southern sub-regions, - including, at 
an earlier stage of history, Austria - were significantly affected by restrictive policy changes 
in neighbouring destination countries, and particularly by those introduced by Germany. 
Such restrictions almost inevitably inspired policy changes in the Eastern transit countries, 
as in Western states, inspired by the fear of a closed-sack effect. This fear was caused by the 
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Poland and the Czech Republic, and the Southern subregion is composed of Austria and Hungary. For details on 
legislative developments, see the chapters on the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Hungary in Byrne et al, supra note 3, for details on legislation and reform.  
  
 
increasing difficulty for asylum seekers to move on westwards, combined with the inability 
for these states to return third country nationals eastwards upon readmission from Western 
neighbours. 
 
This was further complicated by parallel mechanisms of counter-strategies adopted by 
individual asylum seekers. When primary destination states in the West erected new 
barriers, asylum seekers responded by adapting their own migration patterns and practices 
in order to evade these new obstacles to entry. Take, for instance, the dynamics between 
Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia in the Central Link. Here the strategies of host 
states, as well as the responding counter-strategies adopted by asylum seekers, proliferated 
eastward, and the circumvention strategies by applicants followed them. In particular, 
persons readmitted from Germany registered as asylum seekers in Poland, to then “defect” 
from the procedure, apparently to make new attempts to “go west”. This explains the high 




There are refugee protection ramifications to all of the deflective measures that have been 
implemented by Western European states. Additionally, they have had repercussions on the 
application of the Refugee Convention in Central European countries acceding to the 
Convention. The counter-strategies operated by asylum seekers against pre-procedure 
returns, have often been inappropriately utilised by authorities in the new asylum states to 
discredit the credibility of their claims for protection against return to the country of origin.  
 
The scenario was quite different for the Northern Link, between the Baltic and 
Scandinavian states. Distinguished from the dynamics of the Central Link by the variables 
of geography and legal principle, the counter-strategies evolved differently. Without the 
green borders of the Central and Southern links, and the barrier of the Baltic Sea, it is 
difficult and risky for asylum seekers to cross borders illegally. Consequently, the Nordic 
countries were able to implement successfully alternative deflection measures, such as 
                                                           
56 Mikolajczyk, ‘Poland’, supra note 19, 53-4; Noll, ‘Protection in a Spirit of Solidarity?’, in Byrne et al, supra 
note 3, 323. Accord: UNHCR, ‘Background Paper nr. 2. The Application of the “safe third country” notion and 
its impact on the management of flows and on the protection of refugees’, (2001), at 1.   
 
donating equipment for sea border control, in order to prevent asylum seekers from moving 
westwards from the three Baltic States.
57 Geographical constraints were abetted by the lack 
of protection structures in these states in the early 1990s, as this alternative became more 
attractive because it was legally impossible to return asylum seekers to a Baltic transit 
country should they arrive irregularly at the borders of Nordic countries. Hence, the strategy 
of deflection from the West in this sub-region gave priority to non-arrival policies, rather 
than the pre-procedure returns on safe third country grounds that were practised along the 
Central and Southern Links. It also lead to various containment mechanisms in the Baltic 
states, implemented through assistance programmes and other forms of dependency at the 
bilateral level, yet coordinated multilaterally within the group of Nordic states.  
 
As in the Central and Southern links, there are less direct ramifications of the restrictive 
measures adopted by the Scandinavian states. With non-arrival policies implemented in the 
Northern Link there may have been a contributing force to reducing the effective operation 
of the Convention. For these policies adopted by the Nordic States affirm the perception 
held by officials in the Baltic States that asylum seekers are essentially illegal migrants.  
 
Another determining force for the asylum systems in the candidate states is the imposition 
of  conditionalities by the old Member States in the Northern, Central and Southern sub-
regions. These bilateral mechanisms are likely to have been at least as effective as other 
factors in motivating Baltic and Central European states to establish migration control 
systems and arrangements for dealing with asylum seekers and refugees. As illustrated by 
the Northern and the Central link, this kind of dependency may have been less transparent, 
primarily because it was often based on a mixture of conditionalities from donor states that 
were providing assistance to the new democracies for capacity building in a variety of areas. 
In the interaction between Nordic Member States and the Baltic candidates, there was a 
clear emphasis on exit control by the latter, and visa-free travel for citizens of the Baltics 
was bartered against readmission agreements covering both nationals and non-nationals.
58 
                                                           
57 Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Nordic Policy Responses to the Baltic Asylum Challenge’, in Byrne et al., supra note 3, at 
221. 
58 See the chapters on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Byrne et al, supra note 3, all indicating that visa-free 
travel was an extraordinarily attractive element in the barter trade on asylum and migration between the 
Nordics and the Baltics.  
  
 
By contrast, Germany put the emphasis on entry control by Poland and the Czech Republic, 
reflecting the fact that no sea border would stop onward migration, once persons had 
entered its Eastern neighbours.
59 For the candidate states, much was at stake, and the 
leverage of the EU at large, as well as of its single Members was considerable. After all, to 
deliver on the demands of their Western neighbour could create benevolence not only 
towards an early admission to the EU, but as well towards membership in NATO.
60  
 
The lateral spiralling of asylum policies that occurred during the formative stage in Western 
Europe appears to also be a feature in the development of asylum policy in the Baltics and 
CEEC states. Legislators in applicant states are as inclined to transport the restrictive 
innovations in the principles and procedures in the Member States, as the Member States 
were to mimic each other’s policies. For as was the case with Western asylum policy prior 
to the formal criteria set by the Council of Ministers in the area of asylum, Eastern states 
were already replicating polices and transferring concepts. For instance, as early as 1993 the 
Czech Republic introduced ‘manifestly unfounded procedures’ into their asylum 
determination procedure, at a time where on average there were roughly 800 applications 
submitted for refugee status per year.
61 The Latvian Government Working Group argued 
that asylum legislation should be introduced in anticipation of EU pre-conditions for 
membership, but also” because similar directions can be seen in the other Baltic Countries.
62 
 
The rippling of restrictive policies in the new asylum states is motivated in part by the 
political persuasion of the fear of becoming a targeted “soft touch” or a “closed sack” for 
the returned asylum seekers from Western Europe. As the figures on European asylum 
flows in the West indicate, there is a very real cost to embracing more progressive policies 
when one’s neighbours are creating procedural and substantive barriers to protecting 
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 From 1990 through 1994, according to statistics from the Department of Refugees and Integration of 
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refugees.
63 Among the neighbouring applicant states, there also is a domino effect whereby 
legislative and policy models for implementing aspects of the asylum acquis are borrowed. 
As is evident, for example, in how the upholding of the safe third country concept by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court in 1996 inspired the amendment to the Hungarian 
Constitution in 1997 in order to deny protection to those asylum seekers from safe third 
countries or safe countries of origin.
64 In part, this is a reflection of the rippling of 
restrictive practices, whereby states which attempt to legitimately provide access to 
determination systems and ensure an adequate provision of procedural safeguards 
consequently are exposed to increased migration and asylum flows which have been 
deterred and diverted from more restrictive jurisdictions. Enhanced border controls, which 
may bar genuine asylum seekers and illegal migrants alike, have an equivalent effect. It is 
no coincidence that in 1998, with the tightening of controls on the Polish borders, the Czech 
and Slovak Republics became the preferred transit route to Western Europe, with German 
authorities readmitting only 2,700 persons to Poland, in contrast to 16,000 to the Czech 
Republic.
65 Furthermore, those measures adopted by members of the ‘first group’ states that 
stand at the head of the queue for admission to the European Union, will be noted and 
potentially imitated by those states currently in the ‘second group’ of Associated States 
whose membership will be considered at a later stage.
66  
 
The phenomenon of lateral spiralling of restrictive policies throughout sub-regions means 
that the dialectical process of restrictive measures and counter measures, along with 
incentives to replicate the restrictive policies of neighbouring states, expands the scope of 
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the European asylum practices, to sub-regions where they will be implemented without 
minimal protection safeguards. At the very least, the transfer of problematic sections of the 
acquis should have been accompanied with systematic transfer of training and staffing 
resources.
67 When analysis allows for an examination of sub-regional asylum 
transformation, it is predictable that a lateral spiralling of like policies will occur in 
neighbouring jurisdictions. These jurisdictions will not have the attendant obligation to 
enhance minimum standards to meet European norms, and where those norms are woefully 
low, they will not have the pressure upon them, or resources and training that the candidate 
countries have when implementing these practices. In the absence of significant 
countervailing support from the European Union, there is little to lessen the threat that the 
restrictive practices pose to the protections under the 1951 Convention well beyond the 
current and future frontiers of the European Union. In effect, the Commission and Council 
of Ministers, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have not only failed 
to address their policy recommendations for the future Common Asylum System to 
carefully include the distinctive challenges to protection in the future Member States, but to 
recognize that these policies will also laterally spiral to the sub-regions falling outside of the 
future European Union. 
 
By complementing regional analysis with a scrutiny of sub-regional forces, many of the 
policies of individual Member States appear to converge with the wider efforts of the 
European Union to harmonize asylum policy between the current and future Member States. 
There are also practices which serve conflicting agendas. An examination of some of the 
features of sub-regional migration demonstrate incongruities between regional policies of 
the European Union towards applicant states and the bi-lateral initiatives of its individual 
Member States towards applicants states in their respective sub-regions. To wit, Austrian 
pressures led to a harsher detention regime by Hungarian authorities by 1998, enabling 
authorities to lock away asylum-seekers for an unlimited period of time.
68 While the 
Austrian agenda of migration control is shining through, there is a clear conflict with the 
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requirement to implement the ECHR, which is, after all, part of the asylum acquis. 
Bilateralism collides with multilateralism, and the sub-regional policy is out of step with 
stated regional goals.  
 
Western European domestic refugee agendas seek to advance the standards of protection 
afforded across their Eastern frontiers through the transfer of funds, training and technical 
assistance. At the same time, by example, they offer their newly democratized neighbours 
deficient policy models which aim to deter and deflect asylum seekers. Moreover, through 
incentives, such as the promise of visa free travel in the West, they even promote their 
implementation in aspiring member states, undermining their alternative policy objective of 
advancing refugee protection standards. 
 
5. Conclusions on the Role of State Practice in the Formation of International Refugee 
Law 
 
In this article, we have argued that the traditional pattern of explaining legislative 
tendencies in Europe through the regional standards set in the acquis communautaire is 
inadequate, and that the framework of analysis must be expanded. To understand the 
development of European asylum law in context, one needs to acknowledge that refugee 
law forms at the domestic level. This article looks at how sub-regional repercussions are 
sent out by domestic legislation beyond jurisdictional borders. These may entice 
neighbouring states to import the underlying ideas and concepts of these asylum laws, and 
adapt them to respond to pressures of national politics and sub-regional migration. In 
reality, asylum norms are transformed in a constant interplay between domestic, sub-
regional and regional forces, rather than replicated from the acquis into domestic 
legislation. Hence, domestic legislation in neighbouring countries can very well vary at the 
level of specific legal rules into which the imported ideas are translated.  
 
The normative patterns forming at the sub-regional level are driven by the dynamics of the 
power relationship between the states and the impact of domestic policies in a sub-regional 
grouping. This lateral process of formation and transformation is critical for the formulation 




Instead, a parallel process at the regional level seems to capture our imagination. This 
regional process allowed Western European states to lift up their substantive domestic 
norms and practices to the policy level of the EC, and, later, of the EU. In addition, norms 
and mechanisms of coordination, such as the Schengen and Dublin Conventions, were 
negotiated. For a long time, this regional process produced a host of instruments replicating 
substantive domestic solutions without having the clout to impact on practices of other 
Member States. A consensus requirement ensured that any Member State could object to 
any formulation threatening the persistence of their own domestic legislation. With the 
exception of the Dublin and Schengen Conventions, moulded into the form of a treaty under 
international law, most instruments remained dead letter, unable to impact domestic law 
and practice. Sub-regional transformation continued the actual work, while the unwitting 
credited the regional process and compounded the myth of a Brussels dictate. 
 
This changed with enlargement, bringing the regional acquis into a barter trade of 
membership traded against norm compliance. Suddenly, the soft acquis hardened, and an 
institutional framework was set up to control its implementation. Interestingly, the 
“twinning” employed in this transfer of knowledge and norms emulated the dynamics of 
normative transformation at the sub-regional level.
69 The EU sought to copy what had 
developed in the free interplay of forces between neighbouring states. While the idea of 
vertical transformation made sense when exporting basic structures of migration and 
asylum law into the candidate countries, sub-regional transformation between neighbours 
still provided the critical clout in instituting precise norms.  
 
Parallel to enlargement, the old Members set out to reform the acquis, essentially 
replicating the transfer of their domestic norms into the “minimum standards” of regional 
instruments. While much of the actual negotiations of the reform acquis paid heed to the 
egalitarian principle of not harming each other’s domestic legislation, the institutional set-
up had been changed with the Commission being given a right to initiative. Only at this 
stage, the myth of vertical transformation started to make sense within the group of old 
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Members. Its full potential will be felt when the Common European Asylum System enters 
its second phase of development, with further moves from a state-centrist to an 
institutionalist-unionist form of norm creation and proliferation.  
 
Does this mean that we may discard the analytical model which focuses on sub-regional 
dynamics after 2004? Not so. Ironically, enlargement itself provided a major clawback: the 
likelihood is strong that new Member States will not welcome yet additional and continued 
re-engineering of domestic asylum and migration law and opt for the protection of status 
quo in this area. They might form a conservative faction in the Council, ensuring that 
protectionist policies will prevail over integrationist ones in spite of Qualified Majority 
Voting. This, again, will leave the development of asylum and migration law in the hands of 
sub-regional transformation, both within and beyond the future Union.  
  
What does this mean for the analysis of international refugee and migration law? 
International lawyers need to reconsider the standard framework for examining asylum law, 
as state practice cannot be understood from an exclusive examination of regional 
instruments, as those adopted by EU institutions. Rather, such instruments should be seen 
merely as transmission belts, leading us back to the study of refugee law and policy in 
domestic systems. This creates a challenge for scholars to engage in a more comprehensive 
collaborative work across borders. We shall then find that the solutions chosen are 
heterogeneous, shunning the myths of harmony or unity. This is a problem which scholars 
of customary international law are well acquainted with: the quest for the normative leads 
to the quagmire of the explicative.  
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